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Similar to other states in the Southern Region, Florida is facing the challenge of meeting the 
water demands of its growing population given a) competing demands for instream (or inground) 
and agricultural water uses, b) the stock of water resources that is very costly to extend (e.g., the 
estimated cost of water from the Tampa Bay Seawater Desalination Plant in 2006 was $3.19 per 
thousand gallons (Bernett 2007), which is above the average charge for water in the southern 
United States (AWWA and Raftelis 2006)), and c) periodic droughts and potential climate 
change effects on water resources (Griffin 2007, Dziegielewski and Kiefer 2008).  State agencies 
and water utilities focus on reduction of discretionary water consumption per capita and water 
conservation, and conservation pricing is one type of policy instruments that is currently 
promoted (AWWA 2008). 
Conservation rates are usually defined as uniform (where customers pay a set fee for each unit of 
water used) or inclining block rate structures, where unit water rate increases with rise in water 
use volume (Daniel and Lingo 1997).  As oppose to water use restrictions, conservation water 
rates allow consumers the flexibility to decide if, when and how, to reduce water use (Olmstead 
and Stavins 2008).  Empirical research suggests that water usage responds to price changes 
(Whitcomb 2005, Dalhuisen 2003); however, the response depends on specific characteristics of 
rate structures (such as the magnitude of unit price change in response to water use increase, unit 
rate for non-discretionary water use, etc.). Furthermore, water utility companies may not have 
strong incentives to implement conservation rates if the rates affect their revenues or revenue 
variability (Beecher, et al 1994).  In addition, some conservation rate structures may be 
inequitable, in the sense that the “revenue burden” is borne disproportionately by some customer 
groups (Morgan 1987, Rogers et al 2002), which may make some rate structures unpopular with 
consumers and politically unfeasible.     
Uniform and inclining block rate structures take many forms, based on the unit rates set for each 
price block, and water usage range covered by each price block. In addition to water unit rates, 
fixed fees are often used to stabilize utilities’ revenues, and residential sewer bills are generally 
based on water bills.  Thus, in Florida, there is wide variation in the water rate structures.  There 
is also very limited empirical evidence in Florida about the advantages and disadvantages of 
using different rate structures.  The purpose of this study is to provide evidence about tradeoffs 
faced by water utilities that implement conservation rates. Several specific research objectives 
contribute to this overall goal: 1) to analyze whether  the number of price blocks affects the 
conservation incentives faced by residential consumers; 2) to test for statistical evidence that rate 
structure effects utility revenue or revenue variability; and 3) to analyze the impact of different 




Literature Review  
The relationship between water rate and water usage / conservation has been traditionally 
explored by analyzing the elasticity of water demand. Price elasticity is defined as the percent 
change in water usage in response to the certain percent change in price (rate). For residential 
customers, a 10% increase in rate will most likely result in reductions in water usage within the 
range of 1% to 3%  (AWWA 2000).  Price elasticity depends on a variety of factors, such as: the 
size of wastewater and fixed charges in customer bills; percent of total income spent on water; 
price of water from alternative water sources (such as private wells); length of time over which 
rates and water demands are evaluated; climate and weather events; initial water rates against 
which the elasticity is measured; type of water use (indoor vs. outdoor); season and time of the 
day (peak vs. off-peak periods); geographical region; customers’ knowledge of their water rates; 
and presence of other conservation and education programs (AWWA 2000; Carter and Milon 
2005; Cavanaugh, et al. 2002, Dalhuisen et al. 2003, Espey et al. 1997; Howe 2002; Howe and 
Goemans 2002, Wang et al. 2005).  
Economic research has also explored the relationship between water conservation and the 
revenue of water utilities. The National Regulatory Research Institute (1994) suggests that since 
water demand is inelastic, increased rates actually have the potential to increase revenue while 
reducing water use. Contrary to this, among the 23 utilities nationwide responded to the survey 
by Wang et al. (2005), 9% of utilities responded that conservation rates increased their revenues, 
while 26% reported that revenues decreased, 30% considered conservation rates to be revenue-
neutral ( 35% did not know or gave no response).                   
The literature also discusses the potential for conservation rates to increase revenue variability 
(AWWA 2000, Chestnutt 1993). Increased revenue variability inflicts greater financial 
borrowing expenses and planning/informational expenses for water utilities (Chesnutt et al. 
1993).  Since utility companies generally have very high “up front” fixed costs, they often must 
dedicate a fairly large share of revenue servicing debt. As a result, utility companies have a 
vested interest in revenue stability (McLarty and Heany 2008).  Generally, revenue streams from 
inclining block structures are more variable than revenue streams from declining block structures 
(AWWA 2000). Smaller utilities may be more affected by revenue variability than larger 
utilities. In a survey of North Carolina utilities, Nida and Eskaf (2009) observed larger fixed fees 
in smaller utilities and hypothesized that “smaller utilities may, on average, have less stable 
customer consumption and therefore decide to shift greater proportion of their operating costs 
into the base charge.” (p. 5).  
Finally, research on the topic of water rates and customer equity showed evidence that poorly 
designed conservation rate structures can lead to an inequitable billing of different customer 
groups (AWWA 2000).  Renwick and Archibald (1998) find that water use of low income 
customers is more responsive to price increase than the water use of high income customers. 
“These results suggest that price policy will achieve a larger reduction in residential demand in a 3 
 
lower income community than in a higher income community, all other factors held constant. 
Results also suggest that if price policy is the primary DSM (demand side management) 
instrument in a particular locale, lower income households will bear a larger share of the 
conservation burden” (p. 357).  However, Agthe and Billings (1987) demonstrate that with 
proper design of the inclining block rate structures, steeper price blocks will actually lead to 
greater distributional equity.  The authors show that by making price blocks steeper, a utility 
could increase the incentive to conserve without adding any price burden to low income users.  
Data and Methods 
The analysis is based on 1998-2003 billing, water use, socio-demographic, and attitudinal data 
for a sample of 7200 households served by 16 Florida utilities (Whitcomb 2005).    During the 
study period, a variety of rate structures were used, including uniform and inclining block with 
anywhere from two to six price blocks.  Each period of time during which a utility used a distinct 
water rate was considered to be an independent “rate structure period.”  Between the 16 utilities 
and six years of the study, there are 66 different rate structure periods in the sample.  
To explore the relationship between the number of price blocks and the “strength” of 
conservation price signals, average and marginal prices were calculated for each rate structure 
period.  Higher prices are assumed to create stronger incentives to conserve water. There is no 
consensus in the literature about whether households respond to average prices, marginal prices, 
or both ( EFC 2006), and hence, both average and marginal prices were estimated. The prices 
were estimated given the average monthly household water use level (9,360 gallons/month), 
calculated as an average of monthly use for all households in the sample and for the whole 
duration of the study period.  Our hypothesis is that average and marginal prices are higher for 
water rate structures with the larger number of price blocks.   
Also, following EFC (2006), reduction in water bill associated with a 40% reduction in water use 
was calculated for all rate structure periods.  The greater the calculated savings, the stronger 
incentives households would have to reduce water usage.  Both the actual value and the percent 
reduction from the total water bill were estimated.  The 40% reduction was calculated for two 
different water use levels: 9,360 gallons/month (the average monthly water use for the whole 
sample and whole study period) and 12,000 gallons / month (the third quartile of household 
monthly use in the sample).  In absolute terms, this meant a reduction from 9360 gallons to 5616 
gallons per month in the first case, and a reduction from 12000 to 7200 gallons per month in the 
second case.  Again, our hypothesis is that reductions in water bills are higher, and hence, the 
incentives to conserve water are “stronger”, for water rate structures with a larger number of 
price blocks. 
To meet the second objective (i.e, to examine the effect of water rate structure on utility revenue 
and revenue variability), monthly revenue was estimated for each rate structure period. Because 
revenue figures were not available, the sum of volumetric and fixed water charges for all 4 
 
households in the sample for each utility was used as a proxy for monthly utility revenue.  The 
average monthly revenues were calculated for each rate structure period.  To test if conservation 
pricing leads to increased revenue variability, the standard deviations of monthly household bills 
were calculated for each utility and each rate structure period.  It is assumed that the greater 
variability in household bills results in greater variability of month-to-month utility revenues, 
since household water usage can to fluctuate from one price block to another (Chestnutt et al 
1996).  An OLS regression was used to examine if increase in the number of price blocks in 
water rate structures was related to increase in the standard deviation of household water bills.     
The third research objective was to analyze the effect of different rate structures on consumer 
equity. Following Morgan (1987),  Gini coefficient estimates and Lorenz curves were used to 
measure the equity implications of various rate structures.  A Lorenz curve for a specific water 
rate structure maps the proportion of water use by different customer income groups against the 
proportion of utility revenue collected from these income groups. Each Lorenz curve is 
compared with the perfect equity line, where each customer income group contributes equal 
shares to the total utility water supply and the total utility revenue.  In turn, the Gini coefficient is 
defined graphically as the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and perfect equity line and 
the total area under the perfect equity line. All Gini coefficient values are numbers between zero 
and one (Morgan 1987). The lower the coefficient, the more equitable a rate structure is.  A Gini 
coefficent of zero represents a perfectly equitable distribution.  Table 1 shows the five income 
groups used, and, Figure 1 shows a sample Lorenz curve. 
Table 1. Customer Income Groups. 
Name   Income range 
Income group 1  <$15,000 per year 
Income group 2  $15,000-$29,999 per year 
Income group 3  $30,000-$49,999 per year 
Income group 4  $50,000-79,000 per year 
Income group 5  $80,000-$100,000 per year 






The analysis pertaining to the first objective (conservation “price signals”) yielded mixed results. 
In the case of average and marginal prices, there is no strong evidence that any one type of rate 
structure sends stronger price signals than any other type.  The highest observed average prices 
were in periods with uniform rates while the lowest average prices were observed for periods 
with multiple price blocks.  Figure 2 shows the six rate periods with the highest, and the six with 
the lowest, observed average prices.  Similarly, no consistent trends were observed for marginal 
prices (Figure 3).  
Table 2. Color Code Legend for figures. 
Type of Rate Structure  Figure Color Code 
Uniform   
Inclining Block with three or less price blocks   



































































































































Top and Bottom Six Observed Marginal Prices at 9,360 Gallon usage level Figure 37 
 
 
The analysis of household savings due to water use reduction, on the other hand, suggests that 
water rate structures with more than three price blocks tend to create stronger incentives to 
conserve water than other types of rate structures.  Figures 4 and 5 show the reduction in 
monthly water bill associated with a 40% reduction in use from the average household level and 
from the third quartile of household use, respectively.  In both cases, the largest observed bill 
reductions (as percent from the total bill) were observed for the rate structure periods with more 
than three price blocks.  In the Figures, a blue line shows the 40% threshold.  Any point above 
this line represents a rate structure period where a 40% reduction in use would result in more 
than a 40% bill reduction.  In both Figures, all points on or above this line represented periods 
with increasing block rates.  All uniform rate periods appear below the line.  However, it is 
important to note that results for some of the water rate structures with more than three price 
blocks are comparable with the results for other rate structures.  Hence, large number of price 
















































Actual Reduction in Water Bill
Price Signals as Consumption Declines from 9,360 to 
5616 gallons
Uniform






The results pertaining to objective 2 (revenue and revenue stability) also tell an interesting story. 
Figure 6 shows the rate structure periods with the six highest and six lowest average monthly 
utility revenue estimates.   No evidence was found that adding price blocks decreases monthly 
utility revenue. That is, it does not appear that the objective of cost recovery becomes more (or 











































Actual Reduction in Water Bill
Price Signals as Consumption Declines from 12000 to 7200 
gallons
Uniform






However, there is some evidence that the tradeoff between the number of price blocks and 
revenue variability does exist.  Figures 7, 8, and 9 show the histograms for household monthly 
bills for the following rate structure periods: uniform, inclining block rate with three of less 
blocks, and inclining block with more than three blocks. Visual comparison of the histograms 
implies that the variation in household bills is wider for the periods with more than three price 






















































































































































































































































































































Histogram: Monthly Household Bills for Inclining Block Rate Structure Periods 






















































































































































Histogram: Monthly Household Bills for Inclining Block Rate Structure Periods 




Descriptive statistics for the monthly household bills for the rate structure periods with uniform 
and inclining block rate structures is presented in Tables 2 and 3.  Preliminary results for simple 
OLS models are presented in Tables 4 and 5. In the first model, the dependent variable is the 
standard deviation of the household monthly water bills given specific rate structure period, and 
the independent variable is the number of price blocks in the rate structure. In the second model, 
the dependent variable is the same, while the independent variable is the dummy variable 
indicating if the rate structure is uniform or inclining block.  For both models, the coefficients for 
the independent variable are positive and statistically significant, indicating that increase in the 
number of price blocks results in increased standard deviation of monthly household bills.   
For the objective 3 (customer equity), no evidence that certain types of rate structures were 
associated with more inequitable billing distribution were found. Figure 11 shows the estimated 
Gini coefficients for a selected number of rate structure periods.  In all five of these, the gini 
coefficients were low (less than 0.18).  All coefficients were similar and close to zero, indicating 
an equitable distribution of revenue contribution among utility customers.    
 
 
Table 2.  Summary Statistics for 
Uniform Rate Structure Periods   
    Mean  58.73  
Median  53.3  
Standard Deviation  41.23  
Sample Variance  1699.50  
Kurtosis  53.67 
Skewness  5.59 
Minimum  10 
Maximum  478.862  




Table 3.  Summary Statistics for 
Inclining Block Rate Structure 
Periods  
    Mean  7.55  
Median  36.92 
Standard Deviation  48.73 
Sample Variance  2374.42 
Kurtosis  92.85 
Skewness  5.91 
Minimum  5.54  
Maximum  1192.35 






Table 4- OLS results for first regression (number of price blocks) 
R
2  0.065460665 
Standard Error  0.04846904 
F value  3.85252 
Coefficient (number of price blocks)   3.728288109  
Standard Error (number of blocks)  1.899488667 
T-statistic  1.962785129 
p-value  0.054737  
 
Table 5- OLS Results for second regression (rate structure as dummy variable) 
R
2  0.09649089 
Standard Error  24.84673287 
F value  5.873763639 
Coefficient (rate structure dummy)   16.25779247  
Standard Error (rate structure dummy)  6.708158912 
T-statistic  2.423584874 

















Ocoee, Jan-Mar 98 
(Uniform)
Ocoee, Apr- Dec 98 
(Three Blocks)





Conclusions and Implications 
Our analysis shows that inclining block rate structures with more than three price blocks seem to 
create stronger incentives to conserve water. However, uniform rate structures and rate structures 
with three or less blocks can also be designed to create strong conservation incentives.     The 
analysis also shows that there may be a tradeoff between conservation and revenue variability 
(however, to confirm and define this possible tradeoff, further statistical analysis is needed).  
Finally, we did not find any evidence of a tradeoff between equity and water conservation 
objectives for water utilities.           
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